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Abstract Abstract
The present study concentrates on the income distribution effects of A Finnish Work Incentive
Trap Reform started in 1996. I estimate how the reforms made have affected income levels
and income inequality - the distribution of economic wellbeing. I look at the effects both
without and with behavioral response. The data used is the Income Distribution Statistics of
Statistics Finland from the years 1996 and 1998. The empirical part of the study is based on a
microsimulation model. The method of microsimulation is a powerful tool for the analysis of
ex post evaluation of policy reforms. However, the method is rarely and on very few occasions
applied in Finland. The results drawn without behavioral response show that the 1996 data
with the 1998 legislation produces lower values for income inequality measures and higher
average income levels for almost all income decile groups compared to those with the 1996
legislation. However, the changes are very small. When the labor supply effect is included, the
lowest incomes rise only very little (in fact, hardly at all) and the Gini coefficient remains
unaltered.
Work Incentive Trap Reforms, Microsimulation, Disposable Income, Economic Well-
Being, Inequality, Poverty
 Introduction  Introduction
Progressive taxation, together with the income deductibility of social benefits, can create a
situation, an incentive trap, where working does not provide a higher level of income
compared to income offered by social security. In Finland the economic depression in the
1990s with serious unemployment, the financial problems of the public sector and the
complications of the labor market raised an effort to remove work incentive traps[1]. The
number of people employed needed to be increased and the number of people living on social
security needed to be cut. By cutting the incentive traps it was anticipated that the price of
labor and social security expenses would drop, domestic demand, demand for labor and






population groups. Work incentive trap reforms are particularly intended to enhance the labor
supply of those unemployed or otherwise out of the labor force.
Lipponen's first government appointed in 1995 the so-called Incentive Trap Task Force (here
Task Force) to discuss how the compatibility of taxes, social security transfers and public
service payments could be improved to decrease incentive traps and increase the profitability
of working. Income provided by work should always exceed income provided by social
benefits, and working extra hours or otherwise receiving extra income should increase the
current disposable income. Basically, the Task Force was trying to consolidate the aims of
efficiency and equity, efficiency in the sense that people would prefer working to living on
social security and equity in the sense that one of the principal objectives of the social
security system is equal distribution of income (Prime Minister's Office 1996; Laine and
Uusitalo 2001) .
Efficiency of the reforms has already been explored in detail, as an example, in the studies of
Laine and Uusitalo ( 2001), Kurjenoja (2000) and Kurjenoja (2004). But the equity of the
reforms has gained much less attention, regardless of the fact that it is of crucial importance
to analyze the distributional effects of tax and social security reforms in order to target and
implement successful reforms in the future.
The present study concentrates on the equity of the work incentive reforms by looking at how
the reforms have affected income levels and income inequality - the distribution of economic
wellbeing. I first look at the changes without behavioral response and, secondly, the changes
with labor supply effect (behavioral response). The study includes the main work incentive
trap reforms and those tax reforms that were implemented at the same time with the work
incentive trap reforms. Other changes in the social security system or in taxation are
excluded.
The data used is the Income Distribution Statistics of Statistics Finland from the years 1996
and 1998. Important contribution of the paper is a methodological one. The empirical part of
the study is based on a microsimulation model developed by and explained in Laine and
Uusitalo (2001). This microsimulation model, originally intended to study labor supply and
marginal tax rates, has been converted and partly rewritten to produce variables needed in
the analysis of income distribution. By using the simulation model it is possible to separate
the effects of the incentive trap reforms on income distribution from the effects brought
about by other changes in the economy and society.
The study starts with a short background review of work incentive traps in general. A
description of the Finnish Work Incentive Trap Reform follows as well as a summary of the
effects of these reforms. Thirdly, the empirical research strategy is described in detail. Next,
the effects of the reforms on income levels and income inequality is reported, without and
with the behavioral responses. Finally the main results and conclusions are drawn.
 The Finnish Work Incentive Trap Reform  The Finnish Work Incentive Trap Reform
Work incentive traps are normally divided into two. Unemployment trap means that
reservation wages are higher than wages offered to the unemployed and thus working does
not pay off. Income trap means that incentives to carry out extra work are very small because
extra taxable income results in higher taxes, lower social benefits and/or higher public service






Reservation wages can be cut through a reduction in the level of social security (as an
example by lowering the degree of compensation) or by tightening the eligibility requirements
(limiting the number of recipients and excluding them from the scope of the benefit) and
possibly simultaneously cutting taxation. The alleviation of the income trap problem means
reducing high marginal taxation rates, which requires the lowering of the means test of social
transfers, dropping the income contingent of service charges and cutting the progressivity of
taxation (Niinivaara 1999; Laine and Uusitalo 2001; Prime Minister's Office 1996; Heikkilä
1997) .
When comparing the aims of cutting incentive traps and having equal income distribution in
society, it is well known that efforts required by one of the aims easily worsens the
possibilities in achieving the other. As an example, increasing work incentives presumes a
decrease in taxes and, as a consequence, income inequality increases. On the other hand,
reduction in income inequality by increasing the progressivity of taxation may lead to severe
incentive traps (see for exampleUusitalo 1997).
In tackling the work incentive problem in Finland, the Task Force selected two principal goals.
Firstly, the consistency of minimum security had to be increased and, secondly, work incentive
traps of low- and middle-income earners needed to be cut. It is primarily low- and middle-
income earners whose income is supplemented with income transfers aiming at equalizing
income distribution. The target group was especially the working age population. The Task
Force suggested main modifications to the housing allowance, unemployment assistance,
payments of the municipal day-care, home care subsidy and the earned income deduction of
municipal tax. Pensions were not included in the agenda and neither were incentive traps
created by earnings-related unemployment benefit. The latter problem was already processed
by another working group (Prime Minister's Office 1996; Laine and Uusitalo 2001; Heikkilä
1997) .
The basic guideline of the Task Force was that working is a primary source of economic
wellbeing and this status should be maintained in relation to social security. Participating in
paid work was seen as the best way of preventing marginalization in society. Thus, the focus
was essentially on reducing unemployment traps since their effect on people's wellbeing was
considered to be greater than the effect of income traps. The reforms were accepted by
Parliament in 1995 and the implementation started between 1996 and 1998. However, not all
of the suggested reforms were implemented (Prime Minister's Office 1996; Laine and Uusitalo
2001; Heikkilä 1997).
Earlier studies on incentive traps have explored the whole range of tax and benefit reforms
carried out in Finland and the consequences of these reforms. As an example, many studies
have been written about the cuts in social security made in the 1990s, the background of and
justification for these cuts, the economic environment before and during the cuts and the
effect of the cuts on the well-being of households (see for exampleKosunen 1997; Heikkilä
and Uusitalo 1997). The income distribution effects of cuts have been examined (seeUusitalo
1997) but only until the year 1995. Kurjenoja (2000) has studied the work incentive trap
reforms made between 1996 and 1998 and their effect on the disposable income of two-
parent two-child households living in Helsinki and in single parent families with one or two
children. Laine and Uusitalo (2001) concentrated in changes in reservation wages and labor
supply as a result of work incentive reforms. There are no earlier studies on changes in the
distribution of economic wellbeing as a result of the Finnish Work Incentive Trap Reform.






MacCrae (1999) have studied the household labor supply effects of Working Family Tax Credit
in the UK. They focused especially on lone parent households. Blundell, Duncan and Meghir
(1998) have explored the labor supply responses of the UK tax reforms of married or
cohabiting women. In Norway Aarbu and Thoresen (1997) have studied the effect of the
Norwegian Tax Reform on income changes and income distribution.
Summary of the effects of the reforms Summary of the effects of the reforms
A detailed description of the each reform made can be found in the Appendix 1. As a
summary, it can be claimed that the reforms implemented led to decreased taxes, increased
earned income deduction and lowered income contingent on unemployment assistance and
day-care payments. Niinivaara (1999) explains that in reducing unemployment traps the
objectives drawn were achieved. The possibilities for an unemployed person to improve their
livelihood by extra income are now better than they were before the reforms. Furthermore,
the reservation wages dropped significantly in all families, whether it was a single parent, two
parent family, family with more than one child or a single adult household (Niinivaara 1999).
Results in reducing income traps were more moderate. Cutting the high marginal tax rates did
not succeed as well as expected. The marginal tax rates are lowered around 2-3%. This does
not have a real effect on decreasing income traps (Niinivaara 1999). According to Kurjenoja
(2000), incentive traps have remained for young families, single parents with day-care age
children, and for families where one spouse receives labor market support and the other one
is a wage earner. The reforms did not concentrate only on low income households, since
families with two adults and children are not all at the low end of the income distribution.
Laine and Uusitalo (2001) summarize that the reforms positively affected work incentives and
the labor supply. I now turn to analyze the effect of the reforms on income levels and on
income inequality. The research strategy is first explained in detail in the following section.
 The empirical research strategy  The empirical research strategy
The present paper focuses on changes in the distribution of economic wellbeing created by A
Finnish Work Incentive Trap Reform. I especially analyze the changes in income inequality and
in income levels. The years included are 1996 and 1998. Year 1996 represents the period
before the reforms and 1998 the year when the reforms had already been implemented. The
analysis is carried out in steps, emphasizing two perspectives, changes without behavioral
adjustment and changes with behavioral responses.
The data used is the Income Distribution Statistics (IDS) of Statistics Finland. IDS includes the
level, formation and distribution of income among households and the economically active
population. It is based on interviews and administrative records. The sample size is about 10
000 households each year, which makes around 25 000 individuals. Half of the sample alters
each year and the same households appear in two succeeding years. The data includes
sample weights which help in calculating results at the level of the population. The data
covers all income items affecting disposable income and received income transfers. The data
has around 700 variables (Statistics Finland 2003).





where W is the total income of a household and S is the number of household members. When
transferring monetary figures between years, the money values have been made comparable
by using the cost of living index. Ultimately, all figures correspond to year 2000 Euros.
Figures are weighted. It is always mentioned whether the figures are calculated directly from
the Income Distribution Statistics or whether the microsimulation model is used. The income
levels are described by decile group means (and medians in some cases). The income
inequality measures chosen are the GE(2)-ratio[2] and the Gini coefficient[3]. The Gini
coefficient is not sensitive to observations on the edge but it shows the general trend of
inequality, which is important when looking at the changes over the years. Other factors than
work incentive reforms and changes in taxation, influencing the income and income
distribution, are not analyzed here. In calculating the taxes the simulation model does not
include taxes on capital or wealth tax. Thus, from the tax parameter in the original data the
same items are eliminated. Reforms concerning capital taxation are not included.
The microsimulation model by Laine and Uusitalo (2001) is used in the paper's calculations.
The model is basically a tax-benefit calculation program (the examples and the calculations
of the microsimulation model are based on the payments applied in Helsinki). However, in the
present paper the model is applied to examine the distributional effects of A Finnish Work
Incentive Trap Reform. This means that the microsimulation model has been modified for the
purpose of the study. The model has been put together from separate parts of the original
model and every step of the model is checked. The microsimulation model is revised and
partly rewritten to calculate the variables needed, for example, household disposable income.
The microsimulation model combines micro-data (here Income Distribution Statistics) with
tax and benefit rules describing each year's existing policy. This means that it is possible to
combine the 1996 data with the 1998 legislation and vice versa.
The analysis starts by comparing household level disposable income figures and income
inequality indicators calculated from the Income Distribution Statistics directly and the
corresponding figures obtained by using the microsimulation model. This analysis includes
the whole population. Only those households having a disposable income level equal to zero
have been deleted (the number of these households vary between years and between cases
studied and is not considered to be significant in any of the calculations). Household
disposable income is a measure of the monetary resources available to a household at a
predetermined time. Disposable income is a central term when analyzing work incentive traps
since disposable income reflects a household's economic situation after all income, transfers,
taxes and payments (Kurjenoja 2000). The disposable income of a household is formed by
totalling household aggregate earned income, capital income and transfers received deducted
by paid taxes.
Secondly, I look at what effects the changes in the system of social benefits and taxation has
brought about in income levels and in income inequality. I analyze the effects of all the
reforms on the whole population without behavioral response. I calculate household
disposable income figures by combining year 1996 data with year 1998 legislation and year
1998 data with year 1996 legislation. Legislation means here the rules and regulations for
taxation and social security payments. When taking the pre-reform population (1996) and
post-reform legislation (1998) the 'pure' effect of changed legislation on incomes and income
inequality can be seen. On the other hand, when taking pre-reform legislation (1996) and3.7 3.7
4.1 4.1
post-reform population (1998) the effect of demographic changes on income distribution is
obtained. All the incomes in the tables are yearly figures.
Thirdly, I look at the behavioral response the reforms have generated and estimate a labor
supply model. The obtained labor supply estimates are used to calculate the fitted value of
months worked for the years 1996 and 1998 and for each individual. The fitted values of
months worked are again applied to assess the effects of the reforms on each individual's
yearly income. Finally, individual level information is aggregated at the household level and by
using the household disposable income variable it is possible to calculate how the labor
supply changes have affected income inequality measures and decile group means. The
process of forming the labor supply function and calculating the behavioral responds are
explained in detail in the following chaptes.
 Effects on income levels and income inequality  Effects on income levels and income inequality
Changes without behavioral response Changes without behavioral response
When we compare the mean and median values of household disposable income figures
computed first from the Income Distribution Statistics (IDS) directly and secondly from the
microsimulation model we can see from Table 1 that the microsimulation model
systematically overestimates the mean and median values of disposable income (compare
results between IDS: 1996 data and simulation: 1996 data/1996 legislation). The
overestimation is especially significant in the case of low income decile groups. The tendency
to overestimate the lowest incomes is quite typical in the case of microsimulation models.
However, if these errors were eliminated, it would increase the usefulness of the simulation
model[4].
Table 1:  Table 1: Mean and median household disposable income (and standard errors of the mean) by
income decile groups in 1996 and 1998 (in year 2000 euros)


















Decile Mean SE Med Mean Med Mean SE Med Mean Med Mean Med Mean Med
1 7589 64 8137 9043 9676 7682 69 8239 9630 10034 9103 9688 9169 9679
2 10668 19 10684 12049 12093 10875 21 10881 12489 12513 12072 12119 12259 12269
3 12370 16 12444 13582 13602 12712 18 12708 14002 14015 13649 13679 13839 13854
4 13896 15 13927 14869 14851 14386 17 14376 15444 15480 14944 14931 15349 15383
5 15272 14 15245 16201 16211 16068 16 16083 16931 16948 16282 16278 16837 16840
6 16767 14 16787 17573 17567 17789 18 17786 18501 18497 17663 17663 18404 18409
7 18356 17 18345 19086 19051 19696 20 19672 20269 20243 19195 19155 20138 20120
8 20455 23 20392 21138 21119 22089 25 22044 22569 22532 21256 21259 22451 22410
9 23599 33 23547 24051 23900 25575 38 25496 25980 25904 24156 24018 25867 25797
10 34682 337 30639 35219 31496 41020 821 33740 42728 34633 35287 31445 42598 34510
Source: Author's calculations from the Income Distribution Statistics Note: *Income4.2 4.2
4.3 4.3
4.4 4.4
Distribution Statistics **Microsimulation model results
Several reasons can be found to explain the over-estimation problem of the microsimulation
models. Some of the elements of social security can have variation between cities. The
microsimulation model used here is based on the social security payments applied in Helsinki
and these payments are not necessarily the same across the country. Secondly, social
assistance as means-tested benefit is very problematic to calculate. Many of those eligible for
social assistance have not either applied for it or received it. In the microsimulation model,
social assistance is targeted to everyone eligible. This assumption has to be made since there
is no information on those who are eligible on a certain social assistance but who do not
apply for it for one reason or another. In this sense the simulation model assumes that people
know what social assistance they are eligible for and also receive all of them. This means that
the simulation model provides a framework with which to study the behavioral participation
decision[5]. Finally, in the microsimulation model, the housing allowance is targeted to
everyone eligible for this allowance according to their income. Similarly with social assistance,
in reality, not all individuals eligible for housing allowance have applied for it or received it.
However, it is evident that the method of microsimulation is a powerful and valuable tool for
the analysis of ex post evaluation of policy reforms.




















1996 11.13 22.49 9.54 20.33 9.5 20.31
1998 23.95 24.98 25.68 23.56 25.16 23.17
Source: Author's calculations from the Income Distribution Statistics
Note:
*Calculated from the IDS data directly, 
**Calculated by using the microsimulation model
Table 2 shows GE(2) and Gini coefficient values for 1996 and 1998 at the household level.
First, the results are drawn from the IDS data directly, and GE(2) results in a value of 11.13
and the Gini coefficient in a value of 22.49 in 1996. For 1998 the corresponding figures are
23.95 and 24.98. Secondly, the same indices are calculated by using the microsimulation
model and the result changes to GE(2) 9.54 and the Gini coefficient 20.33 in 1996 and GE(2)
25.16 and the Gini coefficient 23.17 in 1998. In both cases the income inequality measures
are higher in 1998 than in 1996. This trend is verified by many other studies as well. As
expected, in 1996, the income inequality measures calculated from the original data are
higher than those drawn as a result of a simulation. In the case of 1998 the simulation
process has resulted in a higher value for the GE(2) ratio but a lower Gini coefficient value
compared to those calculated from the IDS data directly.






median incomes of income decile groups for the 1996 population by applying the year 1998
legislation. The post-reform legislation is applied to the pre-reform population. The same
procedure is carried out for 1998 data using the 1996 legislation. The figures are calculated
from the Income Distribution Statistics (IDS) directly and from the microsimulation model.
The results show that mean and median income values of the decile groups for 1996 data
with the 1998 legislation are almost systematically higher than the corresponding figures
when combining the 1996 data with the 1996 legislation. The only exception is the median
income of the tenth decile group. This indicates that the 1998 legislation produces higher
average (mean and median) income levels for almost all income decile groups compared to
those with the 1996 legislation. However, the mean income of middle and high decile groups,
especially decile groups from 5 to 9, increases more than the mean income of income decile
groups from 1 to 4. This result suggests that the middle and high income earners have
benefited more from the reforms than have the low income earners. Furthermore, the
increase in the mean and median income of the lowest income decile groups is so small that
it cannot be taken as reliable evidence of the success of the reforms (meaning that reforms
had been beneficial especially for low income earners).
Both of the income inequality measures (Table 2) are somewhat lower in case of the 1996 data
with the 1998 legislation (9.50 and 20.31) than in the case of the 1996 data with the 1996
legislation (9.54 and 20.33). However, the figures differ only slightly from each other and
therefore the result does not convince us that the reforms have been successful in equalizing
income distribution.
When taking the 1998 data and combine that with the 1996 legislation (Table 1) the effect of
demographic changes again results in higher mean and median decile group values compared
to corresponding results when taking the 1996 data with the 1996 legislation but lower values
compared to those produced by combining the 1996 data with the 1998 legislation. On the
other hand, both the income inequality indicators address the increase in income inequality
as a result of demographic changes (25.68 and 23.56) compared to the 1996 data with the
1996 legislation (9.54 and 20.33).
Therefore, it can be claimed that even when the 1998 legislation seems to produce lower
income inequality indicators than the 1996 legislation, the demographic effect of the year
1998 operates in the other direction and raises the income inequality measures.
Labor supply Labor supply
Formation of the labor supply variables Formation of the labor supply variables
The analysis of the behavioral response starts with the estimation of a labor supply model.
Change in the labor supply is regarded as the most important behavioral effect of the work
incentive reforms. The time period from 1996 to 1998 is considered to be long enough to
study the behavioral changes since there has been some time for individuals to adjust their
behavior to implemented reforms. The estimation of the labor supply is carried out by
following, as closely as possible, the steps and method explained in Laine and Uusitalo (2001)
in order to maintain the usability of the tax-benefit microsimulation model.
I estimate here the effects of the changes in the tax- and social security system on the
number of working months, the dependent variable. Working months is a natural choice in




individual is employed or not matters, not the amount of hours worked. Working months
include full-time work, part-time work, being on paid sick-leave and working as an
entrepreneur or associate family member. In the labor supply estimation the sample is those
of an age between 15 and 64. The population groups that have not been affected by work
incentive reforms have been excluded from the sample, these being full-time students,
conscripts, mothers of under 1-year-old children and the unemployable. In addition, those
households that have a zero value for individual net income or household disposable income
have been deleted.
The following labor supply function is estimated:
(2)
where h is the number of working months, w(1-t) is the net monthly salary, y is the other
income, X is the vector of all the other variables affecting the labor supply, and  is the
residual. The aim is to estimate labor supply elasticities for net monthly salary and other
income, meaning the estimates for parameters  and .
However, there is two problems in the estimation procedure. First, when modelling the
decision to enter the laborforce the netwage received from the work need to be compared
with the income offered by the social security. This requires the estimation of a relevant gross
wage for those not working, meaning the wage they would receive if working. Similarly, an
alternative income for those working has to be calculated. Depending on the individual
situation of a worker this alternative income would be pension, unemployment benefit or
student grant (as an example). Secondly, the model (above) suffers from an endogeneity
problem. It is likely that the gross wage is correlated with the residual in the model. (Laine
and Uusitalo 2001).
By using a cell model the problem of missing wages can be resolved and the endogeneity
problem can be diminished. The method follows that from Blundell et al. (1998). The data are
divided into 90 cells by education, sex, number of children and age. The education is divided
into comprehensive school, intermediate level and graduate level. The age classes are 15-24,
25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64. Three classes based on the age of children are as follows: the
youngest child is at the day-care age, 1-6 years of age; the youngest child is at school age,
7-18 years of age; there are no children in the family. After removing cells including fewer
than 20 individuals and cells not occurring in both of the years I had 61 cells left and all
together 12 812 individuals in 1996 and 12 776 individuals in 1998.
With the help of the microsimulation model I first calculated the after taxes net yearly wage
and furthermore by dividing this by the number of working months I ended up with the net
monthly wage rate. Each cell was given its cell-specific net wage. The next variable calculated
was the amount of transfers dependent on the number of working months. This was formed
by adding together pension income, unemployment allowances, home care allowance etc. at
the yearly level and by taxing the taxable transfers with the use of the simulation model.
Finally, the amount of these transfers was divided by the number of the months the person
was not working. Again, each cell was given its cell-specific amount of the transfers. The
marginal wage is calculated by subtracting from the average monthly net wage the average
monthly income transfers (transfers dependent on the number of working months).[6] Since
many of the individuals in the sample received either only wage or only income transfers the




By using the cell means the labor supply function can be rewritten,
(3)
The number of average working months is now explained by the average marginal wage and
by other than work incomes. Furthermore, the variable is a dummy for changes in the general
economic situation and the variable Dcells is a cell-specific indicator variable. The
identification of the parameter estimates is based on the fact that the changes in the tax and
social security systems have different effects on the net wages and other income of different
population sub-groups. Changes in the labor supply in different sub-groups also vary.
Basically, what follows is that changes between groups is compared (Laine and Uusitalo 2001).
The two independent variables are marginal wage and other than labor income. Marginal
wage shows the income increase as a result of one extra working month. By applying the
weighted cell averages the marginal wage for each cell can be formulated as follows,
(4)
where mwcells is the cell-specific average marginal wage, w(1-t) cells is the cell-specific
average net wage rate and scells is the cell-specific average for income transfers dependent
on the number of working months (Laine and Uusitalo 2001). The cell-specific marginal wage
depends on average gross wages, tax rates and the average income transfers of individuals
within each cell.
The other than labor income variable is calculated by using the disposable income variable.
The individual disposable income (DPI) is
(5)
where w is the monthly wage, t is the tax rate and h the working months. In addition to this,
an individual receives income from property and income transfer s during the months she/he
is not working (12 - h). When rewriting the DPI equation,
(6)
it can be seen that other income y + 12  s can be calculated by subtracting the marginal
wage rate from the disposable income and multiplying it by the number of working months
[w(1-t) - s]  h . All the figures are calculated by applying the cell means similarly with the
marginal wage rate calculations. Since the disposable income is addressed at the household
level in our data, the spouse's wage income and personal income transfers have to be
subtracted from the household disposable income in order to arrive at a correct individual
disposable income measure (Laine and Uusitalo 2001). The other income is
(7)4.19 4.19
4.20 4.20
Table 3:  Table 3: Mean values of the labor supply function variables (in year 2000
Euros)
1996 1998
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Working months 8.9 1.7 9.1 1.7
Net wage 1148 263 1208 276
Transfers 524 183 496 165
Marginal wage 584 173 707 209
Other income/month 1266 275 1357 303
Source: Author's calculations from the Income Distribution Statistics by using the
microsimulation model
Table 3 shows the mean values of estimated variables for the labor supply equation[7]. The
estimation results are presented in Table 4. The estimated labor supply parameters show how
much the average number of working months change in each cell when marginal wages and
other income change. According to the results the increase in marginal wages increases the
supply of labor. On the other hand, the effect of other income is negative. The results suggest
that 10% increase in marginal wages, around 58 Euros, increases the amount of the labor
supply by 0.08 months, which is around 2 working days. If other income increases by 10%,
around 127 Euros, it decreases the amount of labor supplied by 0.071 months, which is
around 1,5 working days. _
Table 4:  Table 4: Estimation results of the labor supply equation





Marginal wages 0.239* 0.143 1.421* 0.85
Other income -0.094 0.119 -0.556 0.705
Year 1998 -0.06 0.132 -0.06 0.132




Source: Author's calculations from the Income Distribution Statistics by using the
microsimulation model Note: **Significant at 1% level, *significant at 10% level
Changes with behavioral response Changes with behavioral response





where the equation shows the fitted value of months worked M for either 1996 or 1998,
marked by i and either with or without the 1998 dummy d . The coefficients are from the
equation run in the previous chapter:  is the constant,  is the coefficient for marginal
wages, mw refers to marginal wages,  is the coefficient for other income and y is the other
income variable, D98 is the dummy for 1998 and finally Dcj is a cell-specific dummy for cell j
. By applying the microsimulation model, the marginal wages and other income variables are
calculated for each individual separately but whenever this was not possible the marginal
wages and other income variables are transformed from the corresponding cell-specific data
to individual level data. Those individuals belonging to cell 1 are given the marginal wage and
other income figure from cell number 1 and so forth. Cell average figures are applied, due to
the same reasons explained above.
Next a figure for individual yearly income Y is needed and this is formed as follows,
(9)
where Wi is the value for monthly income minus taxes. Monthly income includes market
income, so-called other income as well as those social transfers which are dependent on
months worked. The yearly income variable is combined at the level of households. From the
household disposable income the 'old' yearly income is then subtracted and the 'new'
corresponding yearly income is added. The 'old' yearly income refers to income obtained by
using the months worked derived from the original data. And the 'new' yearly income is
calculated by using the fitted values of the months worked.
Consequently, income inequality indicators and decile group mean incomes are formed by
using the household level data, the household disposable income. The results show the effect
on income distribution caused by the changes in the labor supply. The weight applied is
multiplied by the number of household members and the equivalence scale is naturally used
as well. The analysis concentrates on the Gini coefficient but the value for GE(2) is reported as
well. The absolute values of the Gini coefficient or decile group mean incomes are not
especially important. Instead, the main interest is to look at the trend between various cases
presented. _






Year of fitted values GE(2) Gini coefficient GE(2) Gini coefficient
1996 10.14 21.15 26.74 23.7
1998 10.3 21.16 25.54 23.76
Source: Author's calculations from the Income Distribution Statistics by using the
microsimulation model
I chose two cases to demonstrate the changes in the income distribution brought about by the
behavioral response as a result of A Finnish Work Incentive Trap Reform. These changes are
observed when keeping the data and legislation unaltered but change the year of fitted values
of months worked. Table 5 presents the values of income inequality indicators for each4.24 4.24
combination of year of data and legislation and year of months worked. Starting from the
1996 data with the 1996 legislation and the 1996 fitted values of months worked (individual
yearly income with fitted values of months worked is formed as follows Y = W96M96 ) the Gini
coefficient is 21.15. When maintaining the data and legislation unaltered but taking the 1998
fitted values the Gini coefficient rises to 21.16 ( Y = W96M98,d ). The rise is so small that it
cannot reliably be claimed that there has been any effect on income inequality by the reforms
that have been made. Secondly, when looking at the corresponding change by applying the
year 1998 data combined with the 1998 legislation and the 1996 fitted values or the 1998
fitted values of months worked. With the 1996 fitted values ( Y = W98M96,d ) the Gini
coefficient is 23.70 and with the 1998 fitted values the Gini coefficient is 23.76 ( Y =
W98M98,d ). Similarly with the 1996 data and legislation the change is so small that based on
these calculations and results it has to be concluded that A Finnish Work Incentive Trap
Reform has not resulted in changes in income inequality at the level of all households. The
rise in income inequality in general is a result of other factors than the behavioral response
caused by the Finnish Work Incentive Trap Reform. Table 6: Mean household disposable
income by income decile groups with fitted values of months worked (in year 2000 Euros),
simulated results
Table 6:  Table 6: Mean household disposable income by income decile groups























1 8644 8700 9199 9225
2 11577 11631 12070 12079
3 13160 13271 13731 13771
4 14519 14688 15291 15334
5 15992 16202 16824 16909
6 17467 17645 18447 18540
7 19037 19186 20269 20320
8 21082 21354 22574 22586
9 24011 24248 25851 25919
10 35182 35498 42312 42734
Source: Author's calculations from the Income Distribution Statistics
Table 6 shows the decile group mean income values of household disposable income for the
same combinations of data, legislation and working months as presented in Table 5. The
changes in decile group mean incomes verify the above results. Even when the mean income
of all income decile groups rises for both combinations of data and legislation when moving
from year 1996 fitted values of months worked to year 1998 fitted values of months worked
the change is so small that it is not possible to claim that there has been any effect in income






 Conclusions  Conclusions
The present paper analyzed the changes in economic wellbeing, especially in income
inequality and in income levels, caused by A Finnish Work Incentive Trap Reform carried out
in Finland between 1996 and 1998. Had the reform been successful and achieving its
intended goals (equality goals) the income levels should have increased, especially for low
income decile groups, and income inequality would have been forced to have decreased at the
level of all households.
I examined the changes from two main perspectives. I first looked at the changes without
behavioral response and noticed that the 1998 legislation produced higher mean and median
decile group income levels and had a tendency to result the more equal income distribution
than the 1996 legislation. However, the changes are so small that I cannot plausibly claim, on
the bases of these results alone, that the reforms have been successful in equalizing income
distribution or in benefiting low income earners. Furthermore, the mean income of middle
and high decile groups increased more than the mean income of low income decile groups.
This indicates that middle and high income earners have benefited more from the reforms
than have low income earners.
When I included the behavioral response, the labor supply effect, I noticed that at the level of
all households the work incentive trap reforms have not decreased or increased income
inequality nor have they notably affected the mean incomes of the lowest income decile
groups and therefore the distribution of economic wellbeing has remained almost unaltered.
There is hardly any change in the Gini coefficient or in the mean income of income decile
group means. The rise in income inequality from 1996 to 1998 is caused by other factors
than the behavioral response following the Finnish Work Incentive Trap Reform. Obviously,
some of the reforms have negatively affected income distribution and some have had a
positive effect. We can also assume that there has been, as an example, compositional
changes in the population or possibly macroeconomic factors that have affected inequality.
However, these are changes that cannot be traced with the data used in this study.
The result, of course, is slightly disappointing since the successful equity effect of the
reforms should have resulted in lower income inequality compared to the original situation.
On the other hand, the reforms have not made the situation worse and therefore it can be
claimed that from this particular point of view the effort to increase work incentives has
succeeded.
One important contribution of the paper is a methodological one. The paper used a
microsimulation model to study the behavioral effects of policy changes and, furthermore, the
changes in economic wellbeing that the behavioral response resulted in. No doubt, the
method of microsimulation is a powerful tool for the analysis of ex post evaluation of policy
reforms. However, the method is only rarely and on very few occasions applied in Finland. _
 Appendix 1. The Work Incentive Trap Reforms in detail  Appendix 1. The Work Incentive Trap Reforms in detail
Earned income deduction Earned income deduction
The Task Force suggested re-targeting of the municipal earned income deduction so that
income taxation would be more supportive towards working. In 1996 the maximum amount
of earned income deduction was 336 Euros/taxation period. All the figures are transformed6.2 6.2
from Finnish marks to Euros and rounded. The deduction was 5% of the amount exceeding
3364 Euros. After 13455 Euros of income the deduction dropped by 5% of the exceeding
amount (see Figure 1). In 1998 the maximum amount of earned income deduction was 925
Euros. The admitted deduction was now 20% of the amount exceeding 2523 Euros. After
7232 Euros of income the deduction dropped by 2%. As a result, the earned income deduction
covered a wider range of income earners in 1998 than in 1996 (Laine and Uusitalo 2001;
Prime Minister's Office 1996; Niinivaara 1999).
Figure 1 Figure 1. Earned income deduction
Source:Laine and Uusitalo 2001; Kurjenoja 2000
The increase in the amount of earned income deduction generally improves the attractiveness
of working compared to social security. It must be noticed, however, that in 1998 the
maximum amount of earned income deduction was 925 Euros when the amount of earned
income was 7232 Euros/year. The national income tax-scale did not yet extend to this
amount of income and meant that the total tax rate was about 20% (municipal taxation +
compulsory insurance contributions). The real effect of the earned income deduction for those
earning 7232 Euros/year was around 17 Euros/month (Laine and Uusitalo 2001).
Table 7:  Table 7: Tax rates in 1996 and 1998
Taxable earned
income, in Euros
Tax at the lowest
level, in Euros
Tax at the amount exceeding

















Source: Finnish Tax laws 1998; Laine and Uusitalo 2001
The changes in the tax rate and the progressivity of taxation are presented in Table 7. The
marginal tax rates were lowered at all income levels in 1997 and in 1998. The simulations of
Laine and Uusitalo (2001) concentrated on marginal tax rates (income trap) and showed that
the changes in both, the earned income deduction and in the tax scale dropped the marginal
tax rates by approximately 2% for all income earners and after tax net wages increased on
average 3-4% for all earning over 6728 Euros/year. Thus, the aggregate tax reforms did
slightly encourage working even when the effect was not very great.
Day-care payments and home care subsidy Day-care payments and home care subsidy
Day-care payments Day-care payments
All children under school age are entitled to communal day-care in Finland. In 1996 the
number of family members and a cost-category of district of residence determined income
limits on the bases of which the maximum payment of communal day-care was divided into
five classes (see Table 8). If a family had more than one child eligible for day-care the
payment of the youngest child followed the payment classes. For older siblings the payment
class was one class below the class the younger child was in. It has been criticized that the
payment classes created income traps for families with small children. Another criticism was
that the payments varied considerably between districts/towns.
At the beginning of 1997 day-care payment classes were replaced by percentage based
payments, which were the same in the whole country (see Table 9). The payment was
dependent on family size and was proportional to the family's income. As an example, in a
family of 1-2 members the payment was 11.5% of the amount exceeding the income limit of
866 Euros/month. The maximum payment/child was fixed at 168 Euros/month (Laine and
Uusitalo 2001; Prime Minister's Office 1996; Niinivaara 1999; Kurjenoja 2000). Laine and
Uusitalo (2001) report that the reform of the day-care payments eliminated over 100%
effective marginal tax rates and lowered some of the income traps that existed in 1996.
Table 8:  Table 8: Communal day-care payments in 1996 in Helsinki,
Euros/month
Income limits of the day-care payments
S i z e  o f  t h e  f a m i l y 12345
2 992 1446 1564 1699 2641
3 1261 1766 1917 2102 3330
4 1547 2220 2388 2607 41216.6 6.6
5 1884 2557 2809 3112 4928
Source: Kurjenoja 2000
Table 9:  Table 9: Communal day-care payments in 1997 (whole country),
Euros/month





Home care subsidy Home care subsidy
Home care subsidy is paid to families with a child or children under 3 years of age who are
not attending communal day-care. The allowance is paid after the end of the parent allowance
period, which is 158 days. In 1996 home care subsidy consisted of the basic component, 252
Euros/month, sibling supplement, 51 Euros/month/child and an earnings-related additional
component (see Table 10). The basic component was allowed to all those entitled to the
allowance. The sibling supplement was given to all children in the same family under 7 years
of age and not attending the municipal day-care. The earnings-related component required
that the family's income did not exceed a predetermined limit (see Figure 2). The limit in 1996
was 777 Euros/month. If the family's income was more than this limit, the full earnings-
related component (202 Euros/month) was cut by 15% of the amount above the limit. The
earnings-related supplement was not paid if the family's income exceeded 2119
Euros/month (Kosunen 1997; Laine and Uusitalo 2001; Prime Minister's Office 1996; Varma
1996).
Table 10:  Table 10: Home care subsidy in 1996 and 1997, Euros/month
Basic amount Siblings supplement Earnings-related compnent






Source: Kosunen 1997; Laine and Uusitalo 2001; Prime Minister's Office 1996; Varma 1996
Table 11:  Table 11: Determination of care allowance in 1997, Euros/month




Source: Kosunen 1997; Laine and Uusitalo 2001; Prime Minister's Office 1996; Varma 19966.7 6.7
6.8 6.8
6.9 6.9
In 1997 the whole system of home care subsidy was renewed and private care assistance was
introduced. Parents could choose between communal day-care, home care subsidy or private
care assistance for children under 3 years of age and between communal day-care and private
care assistance for children under school age. Both home care subsidy and private care
assistance included care benefit and an earnings-related care allowance (see Table 11). Care
benefit was 252 Euros/month for the first child, 84 Euros/month for the second child and 51
Euros/month for all other children under school age. In 1997 the amount of care allowance
depended not only on the family's income but also on the size of the family (see Table 11 and
Figure 2). For a two-member family the income limit was 1159 Euros/month and the
percentage for deduction was 11.5% for the amount exceeding the income limit.
Figure 2 Figure 2. Earnings related component of home care subsidy in 1996 and earnings related
care allowance in 1997 for four member family
Source:Kurjenoja 2000; Varma 1996; Varma 1997; Laine and Uusitalo 2001
For a three-member family the corresponding figures were 1426 Euros/month with a 9.4%
deduction and for a family with four members 1694 Euros/month and a 7.9% deduction. The
full amount of care allowance was 168 Euros/month (Kosunen 1997; Laine and Uusitalo 2001;
Prime Minister's Office 1996; Varma 1996; Varma 1997; Kurjenoja 2000).
For a two-adult family with two children of day-care age, the reform increased the amount of
home care subsidy when one of the spouses was working and the other one took care of the
household, and the income of working spouse was between 1009 and 3818 Euros/month.
The increased amount of the home care subsidy resulted in worse work incentives for the
spouse taking care of the household. With family income less than 1009 Euros/month the
reform cut the amount of home care subsidy, which mean that the incentives to receive work
outside the household increased. In brief, the home care subsidy reform decreased the labor
supply of parents with small children. The total effect on the labor supply, however, also
depends on the reform of day-care payments (Laine and Uusitalo 2001).
Housing allowance and social assistance Housing allowance and social assistance





Low income households are eligible to receive housing allowance for both owner-occupied
housing and for rented accommodations. Housing allowance is means-tested where housing
expenditure, household total income and taxable income (including wealth) all affect the net
amount of the allowance. In 1996 the amount of housing allowance was 80% of the
reasonable housing expenditure which exceeded the excess expenditure. The excess amount
was determined by the number of individuals living in a household, by the household income
and by the location of the residence. The reforms implemented in 1998 increased the amount
of housing allowance to cover at least the total range of social assistance. This meant that the
income limit was extended for those living alone to an equivalent level with unemployment
assistance and for other households to an equivalent level of housing allowance in 1995.
Furthermore, the 17 Euros excess was removed (Varma 1996; Varma 1998; Laine and
Uusitalo 2001; Prime Minister's Office 1996; Niinivaara 1999).
An individual whose own income (added to the income and assets of other members of the
same household) is not enough to provide an adequate level of livelihood is eligible for social
assistance. The amount of assistance is means-tested based on household disposable
income and those expenditures entitled to this assistance. Social assistance is formed by the
basic amount and by the amount which is separately defined. In 1996 the effective marginal
tax was 100% for a household receiving social assistance because earned income cut the
assistance by the full amount. The social assistance was changed in 1998 so that it now
included 7% excess amount of housing costs (Varma 1996; Varma 1998; Laine and Uusitalo
2001; Prime Minister's Office 1996; Niinivaara 1999).
For incomes lower than 505 Euros/month the reforms (both housing allowance and social
assistance) had almost no effect. The main effect of the combined reform was a decline in
reservation wages due mainly to the rise in the income limits of the housing allowance.
Increase in earned income raised the amount of disposable income already at the level of 488
Euros income/month. The reservation wage under the old system was 622 Euros/month. The
100% marginal tax rates, resulting from social assistance, had an effect after the reform only
at the income level of less than 488 Euros/month. The biggest effect results from the
increased level of housing allowance (increased income limits) (Laine and Uusitalo 2001;
Niinivaara 1999).
Unemployment benefit Unemployment benefit
The unemployment benefit is formed by two main benefit categories: the unemployment
allowance and labor market support which was introduced in 1994. The unemployment
allowance is divided again into two categories: the earnings-related daily allowance and the
basic daily allowance. If a person is partly unemployed, for example in cases of temporary
dismissal or part-time work, she/he is eligible for adjusted allowance, meaning that part of
the earned income is deducted from the original amount of unemployment allowance during
the period of adjustment. The unemployment allowance was cut in 1996 by 80% of the earned
salary and in 1997 the same cut was 50%. This meant that every earned euro after 1997 cut
the allowance by 50 cents. The intention of the reform was to reduce the income dependence
of unemployment allowance and the purpose was to make working profitable even when
receiving this allowance.
Labor market support Labor market support
Labor market support is a means-tested benefit where not only the individual's own income6.15 6.15
but also the earned income of a spouse exceeding 51 Euros/month affect the final amount of
the support. In 1996 the income limit of labor market support was 933 Euros/month for an
individual with children and 622 Euros/month for an individual with no children. Benefit was
extended by 106 Euros/month for every child under 18 years of age. Labor market support
was cut by 75% of the income exceeding the income limit. In 1997 the conditions of the
benefit were changed so that the new income limit for a couple, married or cohabiting, was
now 848 Euros/month and the labor market support was cut by 50% of the income exceeding
the limit. For an individual with no children the income limit dropped to 252 Euros/month and
the reduction remained at the level of 75%. Other conditions remained unaltered (Varma
1996; Varma 1997; Varma 1998; Laine and Uusitalo 2001; Prime Minister's Office 1996).
The reform increased the amount of labor market support for most of the unemployed and
thus made working less attractive than before for the spouse not working. The reform also
affected the incentives of a working spouse. As an example, by lowering the means-test
prerequisites of the benefit, the marginal effective tax rates decreased for the working spouse
when the salary was between 1177 and 1850. At this income level, the work incentives
increased and due to the substitution effect the labor supply should increase as well.
According to the empirical results of Laine and Uusitalo (2001) the labor supply of the
working spouse increased as a result of the reform.
 Notes  Notes
1 For more information about the changes in income inequality and poverty in Finland in the
1990s see Mattila-Wiro (2006).
2 The GE(2), half the squared coefficient of variation, belongs to the family of Generalized
Entropy inequality indices. They have a property of being only indices that are additively
decomposable by population subgroups, and several members can also be decomposed by
income sources. Thus, they are very useful measures in studying the level, the trend and the
structure of inequality. The GE(2) can have values ranging from 0 to infinity. Zero represents
an equal distribution (all incomes identical) and higher values represent higher levels of
inequality (see for exampleLitchfield 1999).
3 The Gini coefficient, or the relative mean difference, is a very direct measure of income
inequality that takes note of differences between every pair of incomes. The Gini coefficient
belongs to the summary measures of concentration and it describes the extent of inequality.
It is usually viewed by using the Lorenz curve. The Lorenz curve is a graph of cumulative
income shares against cumulative population shares. The Gini coefficient is the ratio of the
difference between the diagonal, the absoluteequity, and the Lorenz curve to the triangular
region underneath the diagonal (Foster and Sen 1997). The Gini coefficient ranges from a
maximum of 1, which depicts perfect inequality, to 0, which depicts perfect equity.
4 The comment of the Referee is gratefully acknowledged.
5 The comment of a Referee is gratefully acknowledged.
6 The advantage of the method used is that the income transfers now describe all the
transfers received by individuals in each cell weighted by the share of recipients of each
transfer. Then alternative earnings do not have to be calculated separately for each income
transfer. Furthermore, the expected net wage for those not working is acquired, which is anaverage wage for those of the same age, having similar education and being in a similar
family situation (Laine and Uusitalo 2001).
7 The OLS regression was used to cell-mean data.
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